


OBJECTIVES

- **Setting:** a decision-maker aims to select people from applicants that are qualified for tasks.
- Impose fairness constraint to make fair decisions (e.g., same acceptance rates across groups)
- Interplay between ML models and people
 - ML decisions affect people's behaviors
 - People generate data for training ML models



Goal: study the **long-term** impact of the fairness constraints on **qualifications** of different groups.

MODEL


Two demographic groups $\mathcal{G}_a, \mathcal{G}_b$

- Sensitive attribute $S \in \{a, b\}$
- **Time-varying** feature $X_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and qualification state $Y_t \in \{0, 1\}$
 - **Feature generation process:** **time-invariant** $P_{X|Y,S}(x|y, s) = \mathbb{P}(X_t = x|Y_t = y, S = s)$
 - **Transitions of qualification state:** **time-invariant** $T_{yd}^s = \mathbb{P}(Y_{t+1} = 1|Y_t = y, D_t = d, S = s)$
- **Qualification rate** $\alpha_t^s = P_{Y_t|S}(1|s)$
- Inequality measure: disparity between α_t^a and α_t^b

Myopic decision-maker's optimal fair policies π_t^a, π_t^b

- $\max_{\pi^a, \pi^b} U_t(\pi^a, \pi^b) = \mathbb{E}[R(D_t, Y_t)]$
 - Unconstrained (UN)
 - Demographic Parity (DP): $\mathcal{P}_{\text{DP}}^s(x) = P_{X|S}(x|s)$
 - Equal Opportunity (EqOpt): $\mathcal{P}_{\text{EqOpt}}^s(x) = P_{X|Y,S}(x|1, s)$
- s.t. $\mathbb{E}_{X_t \sim \mathcal{P}_c^a}[\pi^a(X_t)] = \mathbb{E}_{X_t \sim \mathcal{P}_c^b}[\pi^b(X_t)]$
- Decision $D_t \in \{0, 1\}$ is based on $\pi_t^s(x) = \mathbb{P}(D_t = 1|X_t = x, S = s)$
 - Utility function $R(1, 1) = u_+, R(1, 0) = -u_-, R(0, 1) = R(0, 0) = 0$

DYNAMICS




EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

- **Optimal (fair) policies:** threshold policies are optimal.
- **Existence of equilibrium:** $\forall T_{dy}^s \in (0, 1)$, the dynamics have at least one equilibrium $(\hat{\alpha}^a, \hat{\alpha}^b)$.
- **Uniqueness of equilibrium:** sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium under (A)(B).

Two effects on people


- “Lack of motivation” $T_{y1}^s \leq T_{y0}^s$
- “Leg-up” $T_{y1}^s \geq T_{y0}^s$



NUMERICAL RESULTS


• **FICO score dataset**

- Effect of transition intervention



• **COMPAS dataset**

- Oscillation may happen in the long-run



LONG-TERM IMPACT OF FAIRNESS CONSTRAINTS

- **Natural equality:** $\forall P_{X|Y,S}$ and $\forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$, \exists transitions T_{yd}^s under (A) or (B) s.t. $\hat{\alpha}_{\text{UN}}^a = \hat{\alpha}_{\text{UN}}^b = \alpha$.
 - If $P_{X|Y,S=a} = P_{X|Y,S=b}$, then fairness $\mathcal{C} = \text{DP}$ or EqOpt **maintains** equality: $\hat{\alpha}_{\mathcal{C}}^a = \hat{\alpha}_{\mathcal{C}}^b$
 - If $P_{X|Y,S=a} \neq P_{X|Y,S=b}$, then fairness $\mathcal{C} = \text{DP}$ or EqOpt **violates** equality: $\hat{\alpha}_{\mathcal{C}}^a \neq \hat{\alpha}_{\mathcal{C}}^b$
- **Natural inequality** ($\hat{\alpha}_{\text{UN}}^a \neq \hat{\alpha}_{\text{UN}}^b$):


Case 1: due to different transitions

- Under (A), DP and EqOpt **exacerbate** inequality
- Under (B), DP and EqOpt **mitigate** inequality
- Disadvantaged group **remains** being disadvantaged

Case 2: due to different feature that generated

Under some conditions on $P_{X|Y,S}$, u_+ , u_- and T_{yd}^s satisfying (B):

- EqOpt **mitigates** inequality and disadvantaged group **remains** being disadvantaged
- DP either **mitigates** inequality, or **flips** disadvantaged group



EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION

• **Policy Intervention:**

- **Sub-optimal** fair policies can improve $(\hat{\alpha}^a, \hat{\alpha}^b)$.
- \exists threshold policies s.t. $\hat{\alpha}^a = \hat{\alpha}^b$ as long as T_{yd}^a and T_{yd}^b are not different significantly.

• **Transition Intervention:**

- Increasing any T_{yd}^s increases qualification rate $\hat{\alpha}^s$.

CONCLUSIONS

- Construct a POMDP framework for sequential decision-making and analyze its equilibrium.
- Imposing fairness constraints may or may not help in promoting long-term equality.
- Importance of understanding real-world dynamics in decision-making systems.